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Abstract
Commercial partnerships and organizational constraints, combined with complex 
systems, may lead to division of hazard analysis across organizations. This division 
could cause important hazards to be overlooked, causes to be missed, controls for a 
hazard to be incomplete, or verifications to be inefficient.  Each organization’s team must 
understand at least one level beyond the interface sufficiently enough to comprehend 
integrated hazards. This paper will discuss various ways to properly divide analysis 
among organizations.  The Ares I launch vehicle integrated safety analyses effort will be 
utilized to illustrate an approach that addresses the key issues and concerns arising from 
multiple analysis responsibilities.
Introduction
There are several considerations when attempting to determine the best place to divide 
analysis between a major system and its elements or subsystems. Politics, funding, 
expertise, responsibility/ownership, and clarity all contribute to the decision of how to 
perform this task.  Misjudgment in any one of these factors can cause the effort to fail due 
to confusion when performing the work, lack of ownership by an engineering group, or 
inability to present a cohesive analysis to the safety authority.  Failure constitutes missing 
hazards, missing hazard causes, lack of hazard control, inadequate verification of 
controls, or an inefficient effort costing valuable resources. 
NASA typically writes hazard reports to document the outcome of a hazard analysis. The 
reports themselves are not the analysis, but must represent the analysis and must be 
divided in a logical fashion. Hazard reports include a description of the hazard, a list of 
causes, controls for each cause, and verifications for the controls.  Fault Trees, Failure 
Modes Effects Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, and other distinct analysis types 
are inputs to the overall hazard analysis. 
In order to understand how safety analysis is divided, one must understand how a 
Program is broken down.  NASA typically organizes safety for a given program.  The 
Space Shuttle Program, the Apollo Program, and the Constellation Program are 
examples.  Each Program consists of projects; for example, within the Constellation 
Program, there is the Ares Project (the launch propulsion vehicle), the Orion Project (the 
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spacecraft), and the Ground Systems Project. There are other projects in the 
Constellation Program; however, the Ares I project will be the main focus of this paper.
Division of Analysis
The Ares Project is divided organizationally into four elements: First Stage, Upper Stage 
Engine (J-2X), Upper Stage, and Vehicle Integration (Fig. 1 and Fig 2). The Ares I First 
Stage is a single five-segment solid rocket booster which is a derivative of the space 
shuttle's solid rocket booster. The Upper Stage Engine is a liquid oxygen/liquid 
hydrogen J-2X Engine derived from the J-2 Engine used on Apollo's second stage.  The 
J-2X Engine will power the launch propulsion vehicle's second stage into low Earth orbit.
The Upper Stage is the core structure that houses the avionics for the launch propulsion 
vehicle.  The Upper Stage interfaces with the Orion spacecraft and the First Stage as well 
as the J-2X engine. Vehicle Integration performs many of the integrated vehicle analyses 
necessary to ensure an overall safe, robust, and properly functioning launch vehicle.   The 
Ares I will lift more than 55,000 pounds of payload to low Earth orbit. 
There are several structural interfaces as well as avionics and electrical interfaces
between the elements. The Upper Stage, the brains of the launch vehicle, contains the 
software that controls the first stage and interfaces with the Upper Stage Engine
controller and Orion crew module. The complexity of these interfaces is where the true 
ownership of the hazard analysis is not apparent and has been the root of much 
discussion. The First Stage and Upper Stage Engine being designed by contractors adds 
another level of complexity in the hazard analysis division. Contractual considerations, 
part of the ownership/responsibility factor, are a major driver. The Upper Stage is being 
designed in-house as well as the integration analysis of the Ares Vehicle. The Vehicle 
Integration Team has the advantage of the Upper Stage Safety Team being easily 
accessible, as well as reduced contractual interfaces in data exchange. Working with the 
Upper Stage Element safety engineers has always had a positive effect of performing 
well.   
The initial division of the analysis was not performed using a defined set of ground rules 
agreed upon by the various teams. The analysis by each element including vehicle 
integration progressed to a point that allowed some differentiation to be seen. This was 
not by design, but by necessity. The engineering boundaries, especially in the area of 
avionics and vehicle control, were not defined in the beginning. Initially vehicle
integration using fault tree analysis drove deep into the elements. This was essential 
since vehicle integration was the first element to start developing their safety analysis.  
This initial effort of driving deep into the elements was necessary for Vehicle Integration 
as an “independent” assessment for identifying hazards for the Ares vehicle.  Although 
this effort was done early on in the development cycle, it allowed for Vehicle Integration 
to set the ground work for ensuring a comprehensive hazard analysis.  Once the other 
elements started developing their own fault trees and boundaries started to become 
clearer, Vehicle Integration began transferring many of their lower level fault tree blocks 
to the elements.  Throughout this process there were certain areas that consistently 
continued to have overlaps between Vehicle Integration and the other Ares elements.  
These were pointed out during some of the Safety Reviews with the Constellation Safety 
and Engineering Review Panel.  The areas that were subject to much discussion were 
avionics, the Upper Stage main propulsion system, and separation.  This was due to the 
nature of how the Upper Stage and Vehicle Integration hazard analyses were performed.
Vehicle Integration in the Ares I project is considered an element and does not have any 
real authority over the hardware elements other than the ability to derive requirements 
from integrated analysis. Since Vehicle Integration does not own any hardware, it made 
logical sense to break out the safety analysis by hazards.  Using a top down system level 
approach, Vehicle Integration was able to tell the whole story for the Ares Vehicle. This 
allowed the analysis to be truly integrated, which helped identify any gaps in the hazard 
analysis.  Upper Stage broke out the hazard analysis by subsystems.  These subsystems 
lined-up with the Integrated Product Teams (IPT) therefore each IPT only had to sign off 
on the controls for which they had ownership.  This resulted in Upper Stage deciding to 
create integrated hazard reports to complete the story for Upper Stage.  The Upper Stage 
Team, having integration hazard reports of its own, resulted in duplicating some of the 
same work that Vehicle Integration had performed. As the analysis and documentation 
efforts continued and presentations to the safety panel were made by the teams, it became 
evident that it was time to create stricter ground rules so that the teams, safety panel, and 
future users of the documentation could better understand how to navigate the complex 
analysis that was being created.  
The overlap eventually diminished once preliminary documentation of the hazard 
analysis was established. Communication was initiated to set ground rules and divide 
responsibility across both teams. Unwritten agreements were made which helped narrow 
the scope, but not eliminate all overlap in order to ensure all hazards had been captured.  
The division was clear for the element contractors since they had little integration 
responsibility and had ownership of the control for a hazard that did not cross element 
lines. For example, a failure of the Auxiliary Power Unit in the first stage leading to a 
fire or explosion would be controlled and owned by First Stage. However, the failure of 
the structural interface of first stage to Upper Stage would be an integrated hazard
because Vehicle Integration would own the design interface.  
During this process of identifying integrated hazards, Vehicle Integration came across an 
issue with the First Stage-Upper Stage structural interface. This risk was raised to Ares 
Project.  As a result, a design team was coordinated by Vehicle Integration to analyze the 
interface post Preliminary Design Review of the Ares vehicle.  At the beginning, First 
Stage and Upper Stage each had a baseline design for their element Preliminary Design 
Reviews, but the two element designs were not compatible at the interface. Vehicle 
Integration started with a hybrid design taken from the two elements as well as a couple 
of other options to trade.  Vehicle Integration reviewed and chose the best options and 
now owns the design and stress analysis at the interface.  The elements own the design
and hardware up to the interface.  The integrated hazard report captures the causes and 
controls across this interface boundary.
Upper Stage was not so clear with ownership of hazards.  The Upper Stage provides 
propellants, liquid hydrogen fuel, and liquid oxygen to the J-2X engine. If this propellant 
is not provided in the correct condition, the J-2X engine could cavitate resulting in 
possible fire/explosion of the engine. This shows a perfect example of why the role of 
vehicle integration is necessary.  Strictly speaking, Upper Stage would have no need to 
incorporate any of the controls to provide the correct propellant conditions to the engine 
because it is not a hazard to the Upper Stage.  The actual hazard resides in the engine;
however most of the controls need to be on the Upper Stage side to mitigate the hazard 
from actually manifesting itself in an engine failure.   During discussions with the other 
elements, a few concepts were proposed on the best way to document the analysis and 
minimize the duplication of effort between the elements.
There were two prevailing concepts in dividing the documentation with the 
understanding that the analysis must overlap. The first approach was for integration to 
analyze and document all integrated hazards and for the elements to only cover hazards 
within their element. The problem with this approach was that the integrated hazard 
reports would have to incorporate element controls.  This meant that the elements, 
particularly Upper Stage, would have to sign off on the integrated hazard reports that 
housed some of the controls owned by Upper Stage, the elements would have one place 
to check for integration issues. Since Upper Stage would not have ownership of the 
hardware controls in the first concept, this was deemed unacceptable by Upper Stage.  
The second concept was oriented toward control ownership. In this second concept, 
since integration did not own any hardware, many integrated hazards would be owned by 
Upper Stage because they owned the controls.  However, Vehicle Integration owned
much of the analysis for the integrated hazards. This was true for the first stage and 
Upper Stage Engine.  This process would be challenging for Vehicle Integration due to 
the difficulty in implementing a hardware control that would be owned by another 
element. Another interesting point was that the Upper Stage safety engineers were 
already engaged in the product development teams analyzing the integrated hardware and 
software, not the integration safety engineers. This meant that the ability of 
understanding of the hazard as well as the relationship to work out the best control lay in 
the hands of the element safety engineers. 
A third approach discussed was a combination of the first two approaches.  This third 
approach would result in the Vehicle Integration reports duplicating parts of the Upper 
Stage reports while allowing Upper Stage to continue with a parallel report.  The Upper 
Stage report would contain the controls allowing that element ownership of the controls.  
Vehicle Integration would duplicate the controls and be able to “tell the story” for the 
hazard. However this effort would have been a configuration management issue keeping 
track of hazard report changes and would have caused confusion and increased work 
load. 
Control ownership, the second concept, was the final consideration that drove the choice 
for the division of the analysis among the Ares elements.  This meant that integration 
would write a report that would describe the hazard and point to the Upper Stage reports 
for the controls.  This would allow Upper Stage to document the controls for which they 
had ownership, while Vehicle Integration maintained the integrated controls. Control 
ownership was the only concept that a majority of both parties could agree on.  As 
previously stated the other two concepts would have resulted in more conflict and 
struggle due to the layout of the Ares Project.  This outcome may not always be the case 
in all systems. A project with a strong central integration team, that owns interface 
hardware and the authority, might have chosen to have all the integrated hazard reports 
written by the integration safety team.  
Another layer of complexity in the division of integrated hazard analysis was the 
Program Hazard Analysis.  This was the integration of Ares, Orion, and Ground Systems
Projects. Part of this analysis was delegated to the Ares project. This division was 
owned by the Program, which did have some authority over the other projects.  
Fortunately the Orion –Ares interfaces are more limited than the Ares element interfaces,
and the Ground interfaces have similar traits as the Shuttle to Ground interfaces. These 
have yet to be completely divided. 
Conclusion
There are several factors to consider in dividing hazard analysis responsibility among 
organizations in a large program. The deciding factor in the case of Ares I was control 
ownership due to the organizational structure. A certain amount of overlap in the 
beginning was necessary for two reasons. First, it forced both Upper Stage and Vehicle 
Integration to understand what was beyond what would later be the boundary. Second,
this helped ensure that there were not any gaps in the analysis.  There are exceptions that
need to be considered when breaking out analyses among multiple divisions.  It takes
hard work and long deliberation to separate the hazard reports in a manner that makes 
sense. Ares I’s decision to break out the analysis along control ownership is still in the 
process of being fully incorporated. Much thought has gone into this decision and kinks 
will be worked out as the process matures.  
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